The Influence of the Treaty of Versailles on World War Two - 2750 Words

The Influence of the Treaty of Versailles on World War Two (Term Paper Sample) Content: The Influence of the Treaty of Versailles on World War TwoFirst Name, (Middle Initials), Last NameCourseInstructors NameDate Jean Martet when quoting Georges Clemenceau, then Prime Minister of France said; I know men who profess to like and admire G. Clemenceau, who support the contention that he won the war but not the peace. Failure by malice to the framers of the Treaty of Versailles, the actions of Mr. Lloyd George in blowing up the repatriation demands of Germany and the actions of the US in withdrawing from any involvement with the rest of the world are key arguments that many historians including Hertherton and Martet have brought forward as key causes of World War 2. According to Martet, the war could be attributed to the deprivation of the League of Nations of half of its influence for peace. Germany alone is to blame because she made no effort to fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Although some element of these statements may be true, thi s paper shall not dwell on uncovering the facts. Instead it settles on establishing how the Treaty of Versailles started a domino effect that eventually led WW2. Behind the signing of the Treaty of Versailles were three prominent personalities: David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Britain; Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America and Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France. Two contradicting views marred this process, on one hand, Wilson inclined towards a treaty based on 14 point plan to bring Europe to peace. On the other hand, Clemenceau wanted revenge asserted on Germany. Lloyd who was caught in the middle tried to strike a balance between the two divergent approaches to end the war. In the background, Germans had been expecting to sign a peace treaty based on Wilsons 14 points and were unhappy with the new terms of the treaty but had no choice but to oblige and sign. Germanys rearmament of the Fatherland, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria and the occupation of the Sudetenland were all significant attacks on the Treaty of Versailles on the road to WW 2. Three questions will serve as the central thesis for this paper: How exactly did the Treaty fail in its quest to curtail a new war? More importantly, did the British publics displeasure of the Treaty of Versailles play a role in the budding of the appeasement policy of the 1930s? Did Britain demoralize the cause of the Treaty? Further it will examine how the failure of the treaty and adoption of the policy of appeasement led to the signing of the Munich Agreement which strengthened Germanys position on the road to a new war: an event led to the rise of Adolf Hitler. A final consideration will be to examine the relation to the failure of League of Nations. To answer these questions it is important to point out some noteworthy events that were taking place at the time, post 1919. Firstly, Anglo-French relations had significantly deteriorated. This tended to foster an increasingly sympathetic attitude towards Germany. Secondly, Britain realized it needed its former partners in Central Europe for her own prosperity and had a compromising desire to soften the features of the peace settlement which might have impeded Germanys recovery. Thirdly, both the British and the French were aware of Adolf Hitlers actions in Germany but ignored the situation because they were more concerned with holding back the domino effect; the rise of communism. To Britain and France, Germany building its defenses was essential to prevent the rise of communism to the West. Fourthly, and perhaps the most significant factor was lifting of the war guilt on Germany: There was no more reason to blame Germany for standing by Austria than to blame France for supporting her ally, though Germany should not have given Austria a blank check. The German attack on Belgium was merely the "occasion" for Britain's entrance into the war; the reason was her ti es to the entente and her fear of the consequences of a German victory. The real cause of the war was the division of Europe into two armed camps. The actions of each state were "natural." None were guilty of desiring war, and all were guilty of failing to correct the "international anarchy," which they had inherited. The war guilt debate reached its pinnacle in 1938 with the Anschluss and the Czech crisis. Marriott and Temperley viewed Germany's annexation of Austria as predictable and any response by Britain as useless. The Munich agreement was hailed by others as representing "the revival in this country of realist statesmanship in the best sense. Temperley also saw Chamberlain's policy as realistic and they condemned its critics as "idealists." While pointing to the "tribulations" imposed on Germany by the peace treaty as a justification for the Munich agreement, they revealed a heavier reason for their support of appeasement. There is little doubt that during the 1930s the Br itish public and its leaders alike clung to the view inculcated by historians in the previous decade. The view was that a relatively guiltless Germany had been unjustly treated by the peacemakers and that the injustices she was attempting to correct were therefore legitimate. The wave of pro-Germanism that flounced the nation in the wake of Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland is an indication of the scope and strength of these convictions. By contrast, the dilemma of French security was never grasped, and the significance of the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the trouncing of the Czech defenses in shifting the equation of power went largely unnoticed. In their willingness to undo the post-war settlement, they disregarded the most elementary dictates of the balance of power. Britishs displeasure on the treaty played a big role in the budding of the appeasement policy i.e. giving in to someone provided their demands are reasonable. When Germany began arming in 1934 p eople felt she had a right to protect herself. The Munich Agreement, signed by the leaders of Germany, France, Britain, and Italy, agreed that the Sudetenland would be returned to Germany. The Czech government was not invited to the conference and protested about the loss of the Sudetenland. They felt that they had been betrayed by both Britain and France with whom alliances had been made. However, the Munich Agreement was generally viewed as a victory and an excellent example of securing peace through conciliation rather than war. When Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, he broke the terms of the agreement. The next domino on the road to WW2 was Hitlers actions following the undermined and weakened peace treaty. Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in January of 1933. Almost instantaneously he began secretly building up Germanys weapons and arms. In 1934 he had considerably increased the size of the army and began building warships and an airforce. Cont rary to Treaty of Versailles that restricted conscription, Hitler put into place compulsory military service. In 1936 Hitler directed German troops to enter the Rhineland. At this point the German army was not very sturdy and could have been easily overpowered. Yet neither Britain nor France was prepared to start another war. In the same year, Hitler also made two imperative alliances: The first was called the Rome-Berlin Axis Pact and allied Germany with Italy; the second was called the Anti-Comitern Pact and allied Germany with Japan. In 1938 Hitler began taking back land that had been taken from Germany. In March 1938, the leader of Austria was forced to hold a vote asking the people whether they would like to be part of Germany. 99% of Austrian people wanted Anschluss, union with Germany. The Austrian leader requested France, Britain, and Italy for aid. Hitler guaranteed that the Anschluss was the end of his expansionist aims and not wanting to risk war, the other countries did nothing. Six months later, Hitler did not keep his word and demanded that the Sudetenland region be handed over to Germany. The Munich Agreement stated that Hitler could have the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia on condition that he promised not to attack the rest of Czechoslovakia. In March 1939 Hiltler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia. Despite Czechoslovakia raising an alarm for help neither Britain nor France was prepared to take military action against Germany. However, action was now necessary and believing that Poland would be Germanys next target. Britain and France pledged that they would take military action against Hitler if he invaded Poland. Chamberlain believed that, faced with the prospect of war against France and Britain, Hitler would stop his aggression. Chamberlain was wrong and on 1st September 1939 German troops invaded Poland which was the last domino to drop before the war. According to Cline (1988), In the debate concerning the fairness of the Treaty of Versailles historians claimed to speak with scholarly authority. Precisely as German officials had hoped, the demise of the belief in German war guilt, which was largely the work of historians, raised the question of whether Germany was morally bound to honor a peace settlement concluded under what was later regarded as the misapprehension that she was chiefly responsible for the war. Liberal intellectuals, disillusioned by the Treaty of Versailles, eagerly embraced the new revisionist history as an argument for changes in the peace settlement. When Hitler proceeded unilaterally to dismantle the Versailles system in the 1930s, these historians, frightened by the potential consequences of Britain's opposition, urged acceptance of his aggression on the grounds that Germany's grievances were valid. Shortly... The Influence of the Treaty of Versailles on World War Two - 2750 Words The Influence of the Treaty of Versailles on World War Two (Term Paper Sample) Content: The Influence of the Treaty of Versailles on World War TwoFirst Name, (Middle Initials), Last NameCourseInstructors NameDate Jean Martet when quoting Georges Clemenceau, then Prime Minister of France said; I know men who profess to like and admire G. Clemenceau, who support the contention that he won the war but not the peace. Failure by malice to the framers of the Treaty of Versailles, the actions of Mr. Lloyd George in blowing up the repatriation demands of Germany and the actions of the US in withdrawing from any involvement with the rest of the world are key arguments that many historians including Hertherton and Martet have brought forward as key causes of World War 2. According to Martet, the war could be attributed to the deprivation of the League of Nations of half of its influence for peace. Germany alone is to blame because she made no effort to fulfill the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Although some element of these statements may be true, thi s paper shall not dwell on uncovering the facts. Instead it settles on establishing how the Treaty of Versailles started a domino effect that eventually led WW2. Behind the signing of the Treaty of Versailles were three prominent personalities: David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Britain; Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America and Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France. Two contradicting views marred this process, on one hand, Wilson inclined towards a treaty based on 14 point plan to bring Europe to peace. On the other hand, Clemenceau wanted revenge asserted on Germany. Lloyd who was caught in the middle tried to strike a balance between the two divergent approaches to end the war. In the background, Germans had been expecting to sign a peace treaty based on Wilsons 14 points and were unhappy with the new terms of the treaty but had no choice but to oblige and sign. Germanys rearmament of the Fatherland, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria and the occupation of the Sudetenland were all significant attacks on the Treaty of Versailles on the road to WW 2. Three questions will serve as the central thesis for this paper: How exactly did the Treaty fail in its quest to curtail a new war? More importantly, did the British publics displeasure of the Treaty of Versailles play a role in the budding of the appeasement policy of the 1930s? Did Britain demoralize the cause of the Treaty? Further it will examine how the failure of the treaty and adoption of the policy of appeasement led to the signing of the Munich Agreement which strengthened Germanys position on the road to a new war: an event led to the rise of Adolf Hitler. A final consideration will be to examine the relation to the failure of League of Nations. To answer these questions it is important to point out some noteworthy events that were taking place at the time, post 1919. Firstly, Anglo-French relations had significantly deteriorated. This tended to foster an increasingly sympathetic attitude towards Germany. Secondly, Britain realized it needed its former partners in Central Europe for her own prosperity and had a compromising desire to soften the features of the peace settlement which might have impeded Germanys recovery. Thirdly, both the British and the French were aware of Adolf Hitlers actions in Germany but ignored the situation because they were more concerned with holding back the domino effect; the rise of communism. To Britain and France, Germany building its defenses was essential to prevent the rise of communism to the West. Fourthly, and perhaps the most significant factor was lifting of the war guilt on Germany: There was no more reason to blame Germany for standing by Austria than to blame France for supporting her ally, though Germany should not have given Austria a blank check. The German attack on Belgium was merely the "occasion" for Britain's entrance into the war; the reason was her ti es to the entente and her fear of the consequences of a German victory. The real cause of the war was the division of Europe into two armed camps. The actions of each state were "natural." None were guilty of desiring war, and all were guilty of failing to correct the "international anarchy," which they had inherited. The war guilt debate reached its pinnacle in 1938 with the Anschluss and the Czech crisis. Marriott and Temperley viewed Germany's annexation of Austria as predictable and any response by Britain as useless. The Munich agreement was hailed by others as representing "the revival in this country of realist statesmanship in the best sense. Temperley also saw Chamberlain's policy as realistic and they condemned its critics as "idealists." While pointing to the "tribulations" imposed on Germany by the peace treaty as a justification for the Munich agreement, they revealed a heavier reason for their support of appeasement. There is little doubt that during the 1930s the Br itish public and its leaders alike clung to the view inculcated by historians in the previous decade. The view was that a relatively guiltless Germany had been unjustly treated by the peacemakers and that the injustices she was attempting to correct were therefore legitimate. The wave of pro-Germanism that flounced the nation in the wake of Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland is an indication of the scope and strength of these convictions. By contrast, the dilemma of French security was never grasped, and the significance of the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the trouncing of the Czech defenses in shifting the equation of power went largely unnoticed. In their willingness to undo the post-war settlement, they disregarded the most elementary dictates of the balance of power. Britishs displeasure on the treaty played a big role in the budding of the appeasement policy i.e. giving in to someone provided their demands are reasonable. When Germany began arming in 1934 p eople felt she had a right to protect herself. The Munich Agreement, signed by the leaders of Germany, France, Britain, and Italy, agreed that the Sudetenland would be returned to Germany. The Czech government was not invited to the conference and protested about the loss of the Sudetenland. They felt that they had been betrayed by both Britain and France with whom alliances had been made. However, the Munich Agreement was generally viewed as a victory and an excellent example of securing peace through conciliation rather than war. When Hitler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, he broke the terms of the agreement. The next domino on the road to WW2 was Hitlers actions following the undermined and weakened peace treaty. Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in January of 1933. Almost instantaneously he began secretly building up Germanys weapons and arms. In 1934 he had considerably increased the size of the army and began building warships and an airforce. Cont rary to Treaty of Versailles that restricted conscription, Hitler put into place compulsory military service. In 1936 Hitler directed German troops to enter the Rhineland. At this point the German army was not very sturdy and could have been easily overpowered. Yet neither Britain nor France was prepared to start another war. In the same year, Hitler also made two imperative alliances: The first was called the Rome-Berlin Axis Pact and allied Germany with Italy; the second was called the Anti-Comitern Pact and allied Germany with Japan. In 1938 Hitler began taking back land that had been taken from Germany. In March 1938, the leader of Austria was forced to hold a vote asking the people whether they would like to be part of Germany. 99% of Austrian people wanted Anschluss, union with Germany. The Austrian leader requested France, Britain, and Italy for aid. Hitler guaranteed that the Anschluss was the end of his expansionist aims and not wanting to risk war, the other countries did nothing. Six months later, Hitler did not keep his word and demanded that the Sudetenland region be handed over to Germany. The Munich Agreement stated that Hitler could have the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia on condition that he promised not to attack the rest of Czechoslovakia. In March 1939 Hiltler invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia. Despite Czechoslovakia raising an alarm for help neither Britain nor France was prepared to take military action against Germany. However, action was now necessary and believing that Poland would be Germanys next target. Britain and France pledged that they would take military action against Hitler if he invaded Poland. Chamberlain believed that, faced with the prospect of war against France and Britain, Hitler would stop his aggression. Chamberlain was wrong and on 1st September 1939 German troops invaded Poland which was the last domino to drop before the war. According to Cline (1988), In the debate concerning the fairness of the Treaty of Versailles historians claimed to speak with scholarly authority. Precisely as German officials had hoped, the demise of the belief in German war guilt, which was largely the work of historians, raised the question of whether Germany was morally bound to honor a peace settlement concluded under what was later regarded as the misapprehension that she was chiefly responsible for the war. Liberal intellectuals, disillusioned by the Treaty of Versailles, eagerly embraced the new revisionist history as an argument for changes in the peace settlement. When Hitler proceeded unilaterally to dismantle the Versailles system in the 1930s, these historians, frightened by the potential consequences of Britain's opposition, urged acceptance of his aggression on the grounds that Germany's grievances were valid. Shortly...